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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

CHANGING UNITED STATES ATTITUDES ON EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

OCTOBER 28, 1987

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PUBLIC HEARING: CHANGING U.S. ATTITUDES ON EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1987

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 2257 Rayburn House Office Building at 10 a.m., Cochairman Dennis DeConcini, (acting chairman) presiding.

In attendance from the Commission: Representatives Edward Feighan and Bill Richardson, Senators Frank Lautenberg and Timothy Wirth.

Also in attendance: Mary Sue Hafner, deputy staff director and general counsel; Jane Fisher, senior staff consultant; and Catherine Cosman, coordinator.

OPENING STATEMENT OF COCHAIRMAN DeCONCINI

Cochairman DECONCINI. The Helsinki Commission hearing will come to order.

Senator Wirth will be returning, the Senate just commenced a vote on the budget waiver. We are going to go ahead and proceed, because of time restraints here.

I would like to welcome all of you who are here today and we will have some other commissioners joining us. Our hearing will attempt to address the question of far reaching international implications, whether and how U.S. foreign policy will change, in light of the reforms underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This is an extremely important topic because it moves us beyond speculation about what glasnost and perestroika mean for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to the very critical question of how the United States should respond.

Although the jury is still out on the depth and lifespan of glasnost, it has already begun to alter the way in which the American public, as well as our foreign policy experts, are looking at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We must be prepared to respond creatively and constructively to the forces of change which seem to be occurring in the East.

While not everyone agrees on the exact nature of these forces, I don't think anyone would dispute the fact that Mr. Gorbachev's policy is having at least a perceived effect on people in Eastern Europe. Do the policies of Mr. Gorbachev mean that the people of central Europe will gain greater freedom in articulating their na-

tional identities and in determining their own economic and social policies?

The thrust of our hearing today suggests that this intriguing question should be contemplated in conjunction with the question more fundamental to U.S. interests, are we developing a foreign policy that will enable us to meet the challenges which glasnost and perestroika are presenting to the West?

Eastern Europe has too often been regarded as a homogeneous adjunct to the Soviet Union. It may now be on the verge of coming into its own as a region of countries which are forging a greater independence and diversity in their national policies. It is a movement we in the United States should be prepared to encourage and foster, in a balanced, realistic and responsible manner. The future of these countries does not rest in isolation to the West. It is a delicate balance which we can help strengthen through our participation in the Helsinki process.

I stress the word process, the United States must not miss this opportunity to grow with each of the Warsaw Pact countries as they individually attempt to define reforms within the dual and often conflicting context of Moscow and their own national interests and realities.

We are very fortunate today to have such leading experts on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Ambassador William Luers was our Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1983 to 1986, and we welcome you here.

Michael Kaufman, currently at the Harvard Russian Research Center, was New York Times correspondent in Poland from 1984 until 1987.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, visiting scholar at the Brookings Institute, was State Department Counselor from 1974 until 1977.

And, Edward Kline, President of the Chekhov Publishing Corporation, and on the Board of International League for Human Rights, is a retired business executive.

We are going to ask the witnesses to please proceed, starting with Ambassador Luers. We ask that you be assured that your full statements will be put in the record, and because of time constraints, if you would summarize them, that would be extremely helpful.

Ambassador Luers.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM LUERS

Ambassador LUERS. Thank you, Senator.

Thank you for inviting me. This is the first time after 30 years serving the U.S. Government that I have not had to represent an administration. The good news is you will be able to find out whether I really think anything on my own. And the bad news is that it is still doubtful whether anybody cares what I think.

I thought what I would do is just give a few propositions that I have developed with regard to the Soviet Union and its impact on U.S. policy in central Europe, drawing on an article I wrote for Foreign Affairs that appeared this summer, and reflecting on some recent happenings.

The first proposition is that the Gorbachev leadership is rapidly changing the language and tactics by which the Soviet Union deals with other nations. And I would appeal to the Congress, to the media and to others to try to get that language and style straight, to understand it. I am afraid that the line, the Moscow line is changing so rapidly, not only we can't keep up with it, but even the Soviets can't keep up with it.

Let me just take two examples: glasnost itself, which you referred to. I have written about this, and I have said it over and over again, but we have the word wrong. Glasnost does not mean openness. Glasnost means something different. We gave it that label of openness, and I think we did it incorrectly. We do disservice to ourselves and to our relations with the Soviets.

The fact is the word means publicity, or public airing, or some other term that has to do with open debate. But by openness you can interpret that—an unknowing American public reading that word, which is completely associated now in the American press with glasnost—suggests that somehow the Soviet society is going to be an open society.

If we assume that and they turn out not to be, then we are disappointed. The fact is what is happening with glasnost is one of the most dramatic things to happen in the post-war era in the Soviet Union, but it isn't openness.

Another is word phrase like "peaceful co-existence?" I had a talk the other day with a very senior official on the subject of peaceful co-existence, and that term, which has gotten in the way of our relations since the time Khrushchev visited here in 1959, is changing, the meaning of it is changing. And I asked this senior official what does it mean, and he said, "You ask every Soviet, and he will tell you a different thing, because there is no line anymore, we don't know what it means. We disagree among ourselves."

And so I think we have to be aware of the fact that we are in a very dynamic moment in the Soviet Union in which they themselves don't even know what they mean by words. And that is a different environment for us and for them.

Second, although this vocabulary is changing, we still don't know how much it relates to the substance of Soviet foreign policy. And how it will affect the nature of the U.S.-Soviet political competition in the world. But we cannot assume that it is going to mean nothing. I assume it means something.

And one area of considerable interest is the emphasis given to multilateral diplomacy and international organizations. The Soviet Union, in agreeing to pay $250 million in back debt to the U.N., interested in GATT, in IMF, interested in the United Nations again, for the first time ever, interested in involving themselves in multilateral activities in the Middle East, in the Arab Gulf and maybe elsewhere in the Far East, is a different Soviet Union.

We have to assume that if they are prepared to pay $250 million, if they are prepared to really begin to negotiate in these areas, this could change the way we relate to them.

Now, it is obvious that we are poorly positioned to become a multilateral diplomatic nation. We have conducted our relations bilaterally really for the last 20 or 30 years. And our involvement in

and respect for, as a nation, the United Nations has diminished considerably over the last 20 years.

Should the Soviets begin really to use multilateral diplomacy as a means of conducting their relations with the world, whether it is good, or bad, it will have a profound effect on the way we relate to the rest of the world.

Third, I would say the major area of political competition, which I think is still going to be closed to the United States, political Soviet-U.S. competition, will be within the Soviet Union itself. This is the ultimate problem for us. We can't compete with ideas in their country or in their world, although they compete openly with us in this country. That is the essence of openness, as far as I am concerned. And as long as we are deprived from competing with them, with ideas and with our value system within their own system, the issues of human rights, of the flow of ideas and of people, of immigration will continue to be key issues in our relationships. I don't see that changing fundamentally.

Four, the political competition in the third world is in conflicts. Regional conflicts in the third world is the area in which our relations have had their most difficult hits over the last 20–25 years. The tensions that have risen between the United States and the Soviet Union, basically, have not come out of the nuclear arms race, they have come out of the third world conflicts and our political competition.

The Soviets say that this is going to change. I will say on that one I am still skeptical. This is an area where they have large commitments, they are still a nation committed to certain goals in their foreign policy, although those seem to be articulated differently. They have a presence, they have a commitment to the Communist parties of the world, and some commitment to national liberation. And if we don't pay attention to these and try to resolve them individually, and work with them closely, we could let these get out of hand again, as happened in the midseventies.

The fifth area, and the one most involving this Commission is the area which I think is both the most controversial and the area where change is likely to occur most rapidly, that's in central Europe. The thesis that I presented in my article this summer in foreign affairs was essentially as the Soviet Union presses—as Gorbachev presses hard for reform in the Soviet Union, and in Soviet society, and he meets resistance, the rhetoric of reform is likely to grow. And his efforts to have it take effect are likely to increase.

And as this happens, the impact in Eastern Europe will be much larger than it is in the Soviet Union. As they say a ripple in Moscow becomes a tidal wave in Eastern Europe. And, in fact, these countries in Eastern Europe which have been looking for their national identity for a long time, are ruled by old and tired leaderships, out of tune with Moscow, unlike Gorbachev every one of them. These are countries waiting for reform.

And I would suggest that neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States and the Western countries are prepared for the type of things that might happen in central Europe over the next 2 to 3 years, if Gorbachev stays in power, and if he continues to pursue his policies as forthrightly as he is.

I don't predict any basic transformation in the fundamental relationship between countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union over the next decade. The Soviets won't let that happen. By fundamental relationship I mean that a Communist Party will expire and the country will not be ruled by the Communist Party anymore, or that one of the countries will leave the Warsaw Pact.

But within those limitations, one can anticipate, I think quite dramatic events in one or more countries, as we have seen in the past. And the challenge to Gorbachev will be how to manage that. It will also be a challenge to the West.

As far as policies are concerned, it seems to me they have to be based on several basic principles. First, we can't assume that there will be any fundamental change in this relationship. If we were to assume that, we would likely be taking actions that would result in conflict.

Second, the economic dimensions of this relationship, the trade dimensions, are the key dimensions that give us a leverage over what happens. I would argue strongly that the lifting of Jackson-Vanik amendment and the Stevenson amendments, and the expansion of trade with Eastern Europe gives us a presence which is important.

Third, the Communist Parties of these countries, whether we like it or not, that the administration will continue to play a major role in the direction of change. The regimes that we deal with are regimes that will have to change themselves, in order to allow reform to happen. We should be involved with these governments, we should have improved relationships with the technocracies, and we should try to assist in the marginal way we can to make available to them the information and options that I think they profoundly seek.

I guess the last and most important issue is, again, going back to the first point I raised, we are appallingly ignorant about Eastern Europe. Our intelligence community in this country is weak. We don't discuss with our allies, to the extent that we should, the nature of our relations with Eastern Europe.

And I would appeal to the Congress and to the executive branch to improve that situation and to correct it, so that as we address the issues that we will face over the next 2 or 3 years with our allies on how to deal with the problems of Eastern Europe, we are more knowledgeable about and understanding of the direction which they take.

Thank you.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Ambassador Luers.

Let me just quickly ask you one question. In your experience in Czechoslovakia, and with your knowledge of some of the older leaders in Eastern European countries, do you see these changes occurring while these leaders are still in control, or are we going to have to wait in a few of these countries for that leadership to change, to see any of this movement that you discussed?

Ambassador LUERS. Well, I think it varies from country to country. In Czechoslovakia I would doubt that there could be change in that country as long as the Husak and Bilak leadership is in place.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Will they continue to resist any changes?

Ambassador LUERS. My strong belief is that Bilak has no other way to go, he is the ideological leader of the country. And Husak will go along with that because he is not a strong leader himself.

My sense is that the forces for change will be most indicative in that particular country which you mentioned, Czechoslovakia. If things happen there, it could have a profound effect on the rest of Eastern Europe. And I take your point that probably Husak and Bilak have to go, before that happens.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Thank you.

Congressman, do you have an opening statement, or anything—we are already starting on the witnesses, but if you care to——

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have an opening statement that I would ask be included in the record.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Without objection, it will appear in the record.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD FEIGHAN

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

I WANT TO COMMEND YOU FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING TODAY ON CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE -- ATTITUDES THAT HAVE BEEN CHANGING SINCE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV WAS APPOINTED GENERAL SECRETARY IN MARCH OF 1985 AND BEGAN IMPLEMENTING HIS POLICY OF "GLASNOST."

I CAN THINK OF FEW QUESTIONS MORE IMPORTANT FOR US TO CONSIDER THAN HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RESPOND TO GORBACHEV'S "GLASNOST." IT'S IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER WHETHER THIS TRANSFORMATION IS REAL OR LASTING. AND IT'S CRUCIAL THAT WE DETERMINE HOW WE CAN BEST PROD THE SOVIETS TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY -- TO INCREASE EMIGRATION RATES, TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS, TO ALLOW RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS, AND SO FORTH -- UNDER GORBACHEV.

I WANT TO WELCOME OUR EXCEPTIONALLY-DISTINGUISHED PANEL OF WITNESSES. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THEIR VIEWS AND TO ASKING THEM QUESTIONS LATER.

THANK YOU.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Senator, do you have any opening statements you would like to make, before we continue with the witnesses?

Senator LAUTENBERG. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. What I will do is submit my statement for the record.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Without objection, it will appear.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, gentlemen.

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK LAUTENBERG

TALKING POINTS

* I'D LIKE TO THANK CHAIRMAN HOYER FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING ON THE SUBJECT OF CHANGING U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE.

* THIS IS A TIMELY SUBJECT. IN LIGHT OF GORBACHEV'S NEW POLICY OF GLASNOST, AND THE CHANGES IT HAS ALREADY BROUGHT AND MAY YET BRING TO THE EASTERN BLOC, WE MUST REMAIN ALERT TO NEW DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. IN EASTERN EUROPE.

* I HAVE TO SAY, THOUGH, THAT DURING MY RECENT TRIP TO POLAND AND ROMANIA THIS SUMMER, I DID NOT SEE MUCH EVIDENCE OF THE CHANGES I HAD HEARD ABOUT AS A RESULT OF GLASNOST. >IN FACT, I SAW LITTLE PROGRESS IN THE AREA MOST IMPORTANT TO AMERICA -- BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

* POLAND'S REGIME IS ONE OF THE MORE RECEPTIVE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR GORBACHEV'S GLASNOST. BUT POLAND STILL HAS A LONG WAY TO GO TO BE FREE.

* I MET WITH LECH WALESA, OTHER SOLIDARITY MEMBERS, AND CHURCHMEN WHO CONTINUE THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AT GREAT PERSONAL RISK TO THEMSELVES.

* SOLIDARITY ACTIVISTS ARE FINED, LOSE THEIR JOBS, AND THEIR PROPERTY. THE GRAVE OF SLAIN ACTIVIST PRIEST JERZY POPIELUSZKO, WHERE I LAID A WREATH, CONTINUES TO BE A SOMBER YET INSPIRING NATIONAL MONUMENT TO ACTIVISM IN THE POLISH CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND ITS COSTS.

* DESPITE THOSE COSTS, POLES STILL FIGHT FOR GREATER FREEDOM, AND CONTINUE TO HOPE AND PRAY FOR CONTINUED AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THEIR STRUGGLE.

* I AM ANXIOUS TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF OUR WITNESSES ON WHAT WE CAN DO TO ENCOURAGE THAT STRUGGLE.

* AS FAR AS POLAND STILL MUST COME TO ACHIEVE THE PROMISE OF GLASNOST, ROMANIA HAS YET TO BEGIN THE VOYAGE.

* CHURCHES ARE RAZED IN THE NAME OF URBAN RENEWAL. BIBLES CANNOT BE PUBLISHED.

* EVEN THE MOST BASIC RIGHT TO EAT IS JEOPARDIZED IN ROMANIA WHERE PRESIDENT CEAUCESCU IS STRIPPING HIS OWN LAND OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES FOR THE HARD CASH OF THE EXPORT MARKET.

* THE DEPRIVATION IS STRIKING. IN ONE FARM COMMUNITY, I WALKED OVER TO A LONG STORE LINE TO ASK WHAT RARE COMMODITY THEY WOULD WAIT HOURS FOR. IN THE HEART OF DAIRYLAND, A PERSON SAID: "BUTTER".

* ALTHOUGH I SAW MANY OF THE DEPRIVATIONS ROMANIANS MUST SUFFER, I WAS MOST DISTURBED BY THE PLIGHT OF THOSE I COULD NOT SEE -- THE ETHNIC HUNGARIANS IN TRANSYLVANIA. REPEATEDLY DURING OFFICIAL MEETINGS, I RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE OPPRESSED HUNGARIAN MINORITY.

* THE RESPONSE? FROM CEAUSESCO ON DOWN, THEY SWORE THERE WAS NO PROBLEM.

* SO SCARED WERE THE ROMANIANS OF OUR INTEREST IN THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA THAT THEY REFUSED TO LET US VISIT THAT REGION OR SPEAK WITH ETHNIC HUNGARIANS, SHUNTING US OFF TO A SKI RESORT INSTEAD. TO US, THAT SAID ALMOST MORE THAN WHAT WE MIGHT HAVE LEARNED IN TRANSYLVANIA.

* ONE'S IMPRESSION OF THE CHANGES GLASNOST HAS BROUGHT VARIES DEPENDING UPON WHETHER YOU ARE A POLISH PRIEST, A LITHUANIAN ACTIVIST, OR A SOVIET GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

* BUT IF YOU ARE A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY, A VISIT TO THE EASTERN BLOC CAN LEAD TO ONLY ONE CONCLUSION. GLASNOST HAS A LONG WAY TO GO TO MAKE THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES OF THE EASTERN BLOC COMPATIBLE WITH AMERICAN IDEALS.

* I WELCOME TODAY'S WITNESSES' THOUGHTS ON WHAT CHANGES IN OUR OWN POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE CAN BEST ENCOURAGE THOSE COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE THEIR TREATMENT OF THEIR OWN CITIZENS.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Mr. Kaufman, if you would proceed.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KAUFMAN

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thank you for inviting me.

I am going to talk about Poland, which is really the area of my competence, or presumed competence.

When I first arrived in Poland, 3½ years ago, the almost constant lament of the Polish Government officials was that Washington was dealing with their country in an instrumental manner. By that they meant that Washington was regarding Poland simply as an aspect of its Soviet policies. Poles are particularly sensitive to being treated instrumentally because they have, indeed, been treated that way for centuries. It comes and goes with the territory. From the 19th century partitions to the bisection of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, to Yalta—they have been relegated by others into relationships that were not of their own choosing.

I think it is significant that sometime after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power my Polish Government contacts dropped these complaints. Instead, I started hearing the same things from friends in the opposition who were raising doubts whether the U.S. preoccupation with the yet amorphous changes in the Soviet Union would overwhelm whatever sympathy still lingered here for the hopes and yearnings raised by solidarity before the free trade unions were militarily suppressed.

In that first period of my stay in Warsaw, the American administration was characterizing the Soviet Union as an evil empire and the leader, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense had called General Jaruzelski, the Polish leader, a Soviet officer in a Polish uniform. Within 4 years, Vice President Bush was visiting Warsaw and General Jaruzelski was being perceived Mikhail Gorbachev's favorite East bloc partner, the most innovative and moderate of Communist leaders, whose country was decades ahead of the Soviet Union in glasnost. There appears even to be some grudging recognition that Jaruzelski with his land-owning origins and his army background may, indeed, represent the Bonapartist model that could point the way out of some of the impasses of totalitarian communism. There is a growing awareness in the West that more than any of the Communist leaders of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Jaruzelski, are truly committed to increased cultural openness and economic reform.

There is of course, some validity to these views about the Polish Government and Gen. Jaruzelski, but I fear that they are tending to leave out the most important detail. For, unlike the situation in the Soviet Union, the changes that are taking place in Poland have not been imposed from above by a relatively daring or, far sighted leadership. Rather they were wrested, demanded and forced on the Government by the disciplined social activism of millions of people who were and still are deprived of basic political rights.

Today, nearly 6 years after martial law was declared and the Solidarity union outlawed, there exists in Poland a de facto political opposition, and not merely a group of dissidents. Poland is the only Communist State where this is true. In the fields of culture, information and education, old government monopolies have been

broken, and some incipient political processes have begun as government and party figures are forced to reckon with and respond to views they can no longer squelch. Hundreds of publications are being produced in almost open conspiracies.

The opposition groups divide and splinter and argue with each other, but they have not disappeared. And as they squabble, habits of democratic debate are being nurtured and refined. Consider the fact that a year after the Soviet invasion of Budapest, Hungary had been reduced to a cultural and intellectual desert, its advocates of reform, hanged, in prison or in flight. The same was true in Czechoslovakia a year after the 1968 Soviet suppression of Prague's Spring. But now, though free unions remain outlawed, Poland is alive and throbbing with unofficial groups working to fulfill unofficial dreams.

I have no doubt that the Polish Government deserves some credit for recognizing the strength of this movement, and even for its gingerly moves to co-opt some of its support. I even suspect that there may be a few enlightened people within the Jaruzelski government who recognize the opposition as a symbiotic force that can push the Government into the direction of reform, the very direction it needs to travel and the very direction it says that it wishes to travel.

But I think that the preponderance of credit and continuing real support should go to those Poles who launched the whole process of transformation, and whose continuing pressure on the Government will be necessary to assure progress, at least until true pluralism is institutionalized.

And in this regard, I think the Helsinki process has been an invaluable mechanism of change. It has established standards of civilized behavior in the realm of human rights. Specifically, it has provided already brave men and women with the emboldening feeling that they are allied with powerful forces in the peaceful struggle to determine their destiny. It has also, in an institutional way, projected the quest for liberty that came with the age of reason into a contemporary context. The once overblown doctrine of noninterference in internal affairs can now be exposed as a charade when it serves as a shield for outrage, murder, persecution and the denial of fundamental rights.

The recognition inherent in Helsinki, that internal disaffection and instability can threaten international peace has made a number of trade-offs possible. In some totalitarian countries the Helsinki accords can even be seen as a very rudimentary social contract, since the links it establishes between the national security and the contentment of citizens implicitly affirms that those who govern are accountable for the welfare of the Government.

Thank you.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Mr. Kaufman, thank you.

Senator Wirth, do you have any opening statements you care to enter at this time?

Senator WIRTH. I am sorry to be late, Mr. Chairman.

Cochairman DECONCINI. You weren't late, you were on time and the first one here, and the record will so show.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt?

STATEMENT OF HELMUT SONNENFELDT

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission. I appreciate the opportunity to testify. You have been kind enough to invite me in the past and we have never been able to mesh schedules, so I am pleased that we were able to do so today.

I was asked in the letter inviting me to appear to say something about my views on détente and the Helsinki Final Act as a factor in the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations. I am not sure that in the excitement about perestroika and glasnost backward looks are particularly in fashion these days. But it may still be worthwhile to take a brief look at where we have been, and perhaps where we are, because I think it does affect the way we look at events in the Soviet Union, and the possibilities that open up for American policy.

When the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, in glorious weather, on the 1st of August, there was, in fact, considerable controversy in the United States about the wisdom of American policy toward the Soviet Union and the results that had been accomplished by the so-called détente policies up to that time.

The Final Act, in general, had greater impact in Europe than it did in the United States. There were many doubts in the United States 12 years ago as to whether the Soviets would live up to its terms. Some critics argued, in particular, that the United States had conceded to the Soviet Union, once again, hegemony in Eastern Europe in exchange for little more than vague promises on human rights and other generalities.

In fact, President Ford's speech at the time of the signing in Helsinki was as much a challenge to the Soviets to live up to the terms of the Final Act, as it was a celebration of what that Final Act accomplished.

Few people realized at the time that the impact in Eastern Europe of the Final Act would be anything but the acceptance of a rigid Soviet hegemony. It encouraged the growth of movements in many of the East European countries for human rights, for adherence to the Final Act. So, I think, perhaps unexpectedly the Final Act made some contribution to some of the cross-currents that have already been referred to in Eastern Europe, and indeed, in the Soviet Union itself.

But the fundamental fact was that the Soviets did not see the arms control and other agreements that had been made in the flood-tide of détente, if I can use that term, between 1972 and 1975, as ending the underlying geopolitical and ideological conflict between themselves and the outside world, and especially the United States.

Their military programs, their ambitions in third world regions, their repressive domestic practices, for the most part, and the maintenance of the division of Europe seemed, on the whole, little affected by the several summit meetings that had occurred in the 2 or 3 years of contact, dialogue and agreements that had occurred in the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Still, despite controversy and uncertainty in this country, the United States continued to pursue various avenues of progress on

arms control, various means of consultations with the Soviets on regional conflicts, actual and potential, and in small ways, and sometimes not so small ways, to seek bilateral improvements in relations with the Soviet Union. And it pursued, also, along with our allies in Western Europe the openings presented by the CSCE Final Act and the various follow-on activities. Yet there remained fundamental ambivalence in our body politic and uncertainty as to whether we were going along the right track, and whether we were, in fact, gaining anything from our policies of seeking to have dialogue and negotiation with the Soviets.

Afghanistan and then the events in Poland, and the clear evidence of massive military build-ups, by that time on both sides, seem to mark a low point in American-Soviet relations, after the hopes of détente. Yet it is interesting and important to observe that despite these disillusionments, we were not in 1980 and 1981, in the kind of direct confrontations with the Soviets we had so often witnessed during the period of the cold war. While overall relations were bad, there didn't appear to be any imminent danger such as we had experienced in Berlin, or in the Cuban Missile Crisis, whose 25th anniversary we are just observing, or at various times in the Middle East.

But Ronald Reagan was clearly elected, among other things, on a strong anti-Communist platform, and his priorities initially in his administration were on domestic issues, and on rebuilding American military strength, and with it American confidence. That was sometimes mistaken, widely mistaken, in part, because of the rhetoric used by the administration and its supporters, as opposition to doing any business with the Soviets at all. I don't think that was ever, in fact, President Reagan's attitude as demonstrated somewhat later.

The Soviets meantime became increasingly rigid themselves as the Brezhnev era ended, and then Soviet leaders were in and out of office as death took its toll. Then Gorbachev came along, and ever since his appearance on the scene there has obviously been keen interest in our country about his programs and their implications, both for the domestic situation in the Soviet Union and Soviet international conduct.

And yet, we continue to have considerable controversy, perhaps understandably, as well as unclarity about where all the frenetic activity and some of the rather startling changes, at least in vocabulary and in certain practices in the Soviet Union will lead. Well all of this spell major changes not only in the way the Soviet Union conducts its international policies, but in the goals and purposes of those policies.

A case can be made, and it has frequently, that the Soviets need a degree of external calm, indeed are looking for it, because they want extensive contacts with the United States, Western Europe and Japan, that is the industrialized countries, and others as well, since these are essential for the changes in the domestic economy and the domestic order they are seeking.

There are signs that the Soviets are seeking this. To some extent, this coincides with the readiness on the part of the administration to explore better and safer relations with the Soviet Union.

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But the administration at the moment is clearly subject to criticism—and I am stressing attitudes because the topic today was Changing American Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union—the administration is subject to criticism from two directions. One is that it is not vigorous enough in exploring the possibilities that appear to have been opened, or be opening in the Soviet Union. And the other that it is too gullible and too eager for deals, possibly because it is the end of the Presidential term and the President has suffered some severe setbacks. Precisely those arguments have been heard in the last few days.

In fact, I think the administration has been going down a centrist road. It has established and pursued extensive contacts with the Soviets, and is exploring a variety of possible ways to stabilize relations in the arms control area, with regard to regional conflict issues, and in regard to human rights practices and other bilateral relationships. It is also using the Helsinki process which did yield some interesting and potentially significant results in Stockholm some time ago on confidence-building measures.

Still, I think, as has already been pointed out, we are in an inherently unpredictable situation. The Soviets, and Gorbachev personally, have distinctly not renounced superpower aspirations, nor can they be expected to. They have activated their foreign policies and their global activities, though they appear not to have moved to take advantage of opportunities for expanding their military presence, as they did so much in the 1970's. They are suggesting a more vigorous use of the United Nations, as Mr. Luers has pointed out. Yet it is quite unclear, at least to me, what all this means for their future military policies.

It is widely assumed that arms control agreements are entered into by both sides in order to save resources, and that this is one of the motives why the Soviets have become as interested as they appear to be in various such agreements. But the history of arms control agreements suggests that whenever something is restricted, the parties turn to things that are not restricted, and frequently spend more money than they did before, in order to compensate themselves for what they have just given up under some treaty.

It remains to be seen whether the Soviets, if an IMF Treaty is agreed to and ratified, will then divert resources to other ways of maintaining nuclear delivery systems vis-a-vis Europe, and whether we then do the same thing; or whether it will, in fact, mean a change in their military posture, leading to a change in ours.

We, of course, are already, through our budget process slowing down considerably in our military buildup.

There are also ambiguities in Soviet views, attitudes and policies toward Eastern Europe. On one hand it is evident that they are prepared to tolerate diversity in Eastern Europe, perhaps greater now than in the past. Yet there is also the strong Soviet inclination to invigorate mechanisms like COMECON, which are intended to weld together the East Europeans and the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's references to living in a "common European house," which is an appeal to Western Europe, has mixed implications, if the Soviets are to be the largest and weightiest tenant in that house.

Gorbachev himself runs, twin risks in what he is attempting to do. On the one hand, if he doesn't loosen up and open up the system enough, he will not produce the kind of dynamism he says he wants in Soviet society and in the Soviet economy.

And on the other hand, if he opens it up enough to and encourage real individual decisionmaking, innovation and creativity to generate this dynamism, he runs the risk of losing control over the process. What at the moment is glasnost from above may become glasnost from below, not only in the Soviet Union, but in Eastern Europe as well.

For us I think the issue should not simply be a matter of how we respond. In fact, I think it could be argued strongly that the Soviets themselves are responding to realities, some of which we have helped to create over the years.

The case can be made that in many respects, despite all of our detours and controversies, we have, on the whole, been on the right track to force the Soviets to come to terms, or at least attempt to come to terms with some of the realities.

I will stop here because the time is up, but I am prepared to respond to questions, as to how and where we go from here.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt. We will have some questions.

Mr. Kline?

STATEMENT OF EDWARD KLINE

Mr. KLINE. Thank you for inviting me.

I presume the reason you invited someone who is really an amateur and who is interested in human rights is because you wanted to hear unconventional opinions and something a little bit different. So, I would first like to respond to Mr. Luers, and the fact that I do think that there are very significant changes going on inside the Soviet Union, and that we can have some effect.

You know, a year ago, after Chernobyl and the arrest of Danilov, and in my own case, the death of Marchenko, American views of the Soviet Union were at quite a low ebb. And I would say the thing that turned them around, certainly in my own mind, but I think in some other people's as well, was the fact that Gorbachev called Sakharov back to Moscow. But not just that he called him back to Moscow, but he encouraged him to participate in the forum with westerners. He called him personally and asked him to participate in patriotic work.

And one problem of the Soviet system, if you want to change it—and I am personally convinced that Gorbachev may not want to change it, but understands that he has to change it—is how do you get alternative ideas. In the past, people who expressed alternative ideas have gone to jail, into emigration. It is not a society which has encouraged the development of, or even toleration for alternative ideas.

I think that Gorbachev felt that he had to send a signal and that was the return of Sakharov, but there have been others since which are really quite significant. Today in the Washington Post it mentions there was a meeting of independent press, I think in Moscow, but they came from Leningrad and elsewhere. And a few

weeks ago there was a meeting of independent clubs in Moscow, and one of the people who is leading what is called the Left Socialist clubs, Kagarlitsky, was in jail just a few years ago. And now, well, he is analyzing Soviet society in a fairly sophisticated way—he's young, he's 29, but he did have an official position in the Soviet Union. And he is saying it is no longer enough to just dig into the past and say we have made mistakes, we did that in the Khrushchev era, now we have to really try to develop alternatives.

And they certainly, it seems to me, look to the West for alternatives, both in the economy and in politics—much more than we sometimes realize ourselves. Gorbachev sometimes shows an astounding sensitivity to Senate hearings, to State Department briefing——

Ambassador LUERS. Not to me.

Mr. KLINE. Well, Gorbachev does really pay attention to what is happening in the West.

I think that some of the best analysis of Soviet society is done at the Russian Research Center and by Prof. Sonnenfeldt, rather than in the Soviet Union, and they recognize that. And I do think that we can play a role, not by telling them what to do—they obviously will resist dictation since they consider themselves a superpower—but by developing facts and alternatives.

I did write a paper so people can read a more orderly presentation of my ideas, but I have a couple suggestions which seem to me appropriate.

Many new names have suddenly appeared in the Soviet press, both as authors and as subjects. And we really know very little about these new people who have appeared, and who are going to be running the Soviet Union 10 years from now, or 5 years from now.

Gorbachev has both introduced these people and brought them in. It would be helpful, I believe, to students of the Soviet Union, as well as maybe to Congress, to ask the Congressional Research Service to prepare a Who's Who of these new names and try to understand who is now being brought into the Government there.

I know that the American delegation in Vienna is wrestling with the Soviet proposal to hold a humanitarian conference in Moscow, a conference on human rights. And initially it was viewed with skepticism and reluctance by the United States. And we said no, or if we do it, then only with many conditions.

And even my hero, Dr. Sakharov, has said it is a good idea, but first the Soviets should release all prisoners of conscience on the Amnesty International list, should permit long-term refusenik cases to emigrate and should at least show evidence that they are prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan. But in really thinking about the conference I will now venture my own opinion, I think that it can only be of benefit and be a test of glasnost. If they don't allow Americans or Europeans in freely, or allow them to speak freely, it certainly won't be a propaganda triumph for the Soviet Union.

If they do allow people to come in and discuss freely in Moscow issues of human rights which should include Afghanistan, as well as freedom of speech and so on, it certainly should have some effect on the internal debate there. And it would have some resonance

inside. In fact, in trying to understand why the Soviets proposed the conference, it doesn't seem to me it is really going to promote their image abroad, unless they are prepared to make some improvements.

Maybe Gorbachev's reason for pushing this conference strongly, it seems to me—is to give a further impetus to internal change—I wouldn't exactly call it reform but to get what he would call the human rights problems resolved.

I, personally, believe, and some others do, too, that it was only after the death of Marchenko that Gorbachev had the power and the occasion to say to the KGB, you know, we have really got to move on these human rights issues.

And I do believe that a Moscow conference and the preparation for it might give them a reason to proceed. So, I strongly urge sympathetic consideration by Americans.

Now, I like to think that everyone here would agree that over the last 20 years, and over the last year in particular, American attitudes toward the Soviet Union have moved in what I would call a positive direction. There is still a wide spectrum, but I find very few people today who believe that war is imminent, who believe there is a real threat of direct Soviet interference in American affairs, and so on.

But there are some factors it seems to me that distort American perceptions, in my own field of human rights, as well as elsewhere. And I will mention one, since I am both a human rights advocate and Jewish by faith, and that is while the refusenik issue is a very genuine issue, one which I believe in to a certain extent, single issue groups, and that includes the Soviet Jewry groups, tend to overemphasize single issues and distort the general perception. There is the question of the number of Jews who would like to emigrate from the Soviet Union, the commonly accepted figure is 400,000. But I have tried to talk to people who are both sympathetic and informed on this subject, and the best figure I can get is that there are probably something like 5,000 cases of people who have applied and who still want to leave and whose cases should be reviewed, and that may be a trifle on the high side. There may be another 20,000 who would like to come if immigration were free.

Now, it is impossible to predict what would happen over the long-term, maybe many more would come. I do think that the Soviets still have a way to go on the issue, but we ought to be realistic in talking with them. To balance my remarks on Jewish groups, peace groups and the religious groups affiliated with them tend to take the Soviet Union, perhaps, a bit too much on faith, because their interest is primarily the single issue of disarmament and the nuclear threat. And, again, it is a real threat, but there are distortions. I do feel it is important for your hearings, through whatever means possible, now that change is occurring in the Soviet Union, and a change which I believe is sensitive to the outside world, that we make a real effort to understand the internal processes objectively to the degree that we can.

I don't think we should feel badly when we make mistakes. The Soviets themselves are trying to understand what is happening there. Gorbachev wants a modern economy, but how to get it is a matter of real controversy. And it isn't as if we have the answers

either. There is a remarkable debate going on between the idea of democracy at the factory level or single leadership, and for the first time, workers—at least if the letters are genuine in Literaturnaya Gazeta and Moscow News—workers are starting to participate.

So that you do have on a very rudimentary level something that is worth U.S. encouragement to the degree we can.

I thank you.

SUPPLEMENT OF MR. EDWARD KLINE'S WRITTEN SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE TO SOME QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE HEARING

THE PROPOSED MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

I believe that the United States should accept the Soviet proposal to host a follow-up conference on humanitarian cooperation in Moscow.

I believe that in an effort to prepare for a humanitarian conference, Gorbachev would clean up some of the more flagrant Soviet violations; the scheduling of the conference would place him and the bureaucracy under an effective deadline. The Soviet authorities will have to allow the press, NGOs and the public normal access to the conference, or suffer a serious loss of prestige and a propaganda defeat. They will have to release prisoners of conscience and refuseniks prior to the opening of the conference, or they will have to listen to sharp criticism of their human rights record in Moscow.

I don't see a real downside risk, so long as the Western delegates are experienced diplomats, well-informed on the Soviet record and not afraid to speak out. They will, I hope, bring up the violations of human rights by the Soviet troops in Afghanistan as well as individual cases of prisoners in camps and psychiatric asylums.

Some people feel that we should approve the conference only if the Soviets fulfill special preconditions, or that we should not approve it at all. I, too, want the USSR to implement the human rights provisions of the Final Act, but I believe that the appropriate strategy for dealing with Gorbachev's Russia is disciplined and wary engagement. And the proposed Moscow conference seems a good opportunity to test that strategy.

Now seems the right moment to request copies of all Soviet laws and regulations covering travel abroad, emigration, censorship, involuntary psychiatric confinement, non-governmental associations, etc., so that they can be studied prior to the Moscow conference.

THE ISSUE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION

Jewish, emigration from the USSR is an important humanitarian and political issue; it affects the lives of a large number of people. But the rate of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union should not be the sole indicator of Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. Overemphasis on emigration has created the impression that the human rights issue in the Soviet Union is a parochial Jewish issue, rather than the major moral and political issue with significant implications for international security that I believe it to be.

The 400,000 figure often cited as the number of Soviets Jews waiting to emigrate is misleading. I believe the list of refuseniks submitted to the Soviet authorities numbered between 11,000 and 12,000. Since that time, over 5,000 Jews have emigrated (not all on that list, of course), some have died, others have changed their minds. There are now probably less than 5,000 Jewish refuseniks in the USSR (individuals who have actually applied to emigrate, who have been turned down at least once, and who still wish to emigrate). The number who have recently applied for emigration or are actively contemplating doing so is probably closer to 25,000 than to 400,000; the 400,000 figure is, I believe, based on the cumulative number of invitations—solicited and unsolicited—sent by Israel over a number of years. I do not pretend to be an expert on Soviet Jewish emigration, and I recognize that many factors affect the decision to emigrate—conditions in the USSR, the experience of earlier emigrants, conditions in the receiving countries—but I have not found anyone who contends the 400,000 number is a valid figure. An objective study of the current numbers and general situation with regard to emigration would be useful.

A neglected provision of the Final Act states: "The receiving participating State will take appropriate care with regard to employment for persons from other participating States who take up permanent residence in that State in connexion with

family reunification with its citizens and see that they are afforded opportunities equal to those enjoyed by its own citizens for education, medical assistance and social security."

Many Soviet emigres have been successfully resettled in the U.S. but financial assistance has been declining in this period of budget stringency. Some additional money for the International Rescue Committee and other nongovernmental organizations involved in resettlement is needed now.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Kline.

I just wanted the record to point out that Chairman Hoyer is not here because he is at a very important markup of the House Defense Appropriation Committee, which he sits on. I believe this is the first meeting he has not been at. He has been one of the really outstanding people who has participated in each and every one of these.

I have one question, then I will yield to my colleagues here—I have a lot of questions, but because of time—let me address Mr. Sonnenfeldt, if I can. Hungary and Romania have rather more positive images, it seems to me, in the United States, Hungary because of its independence and its economic reforms which come before glasnost and Mr. Gorbachev.

Romania more because of its independence in foreign policy. Do you have any suggestions regarding what the United States should do to try to reinforce Eastern Europe's independence, and what can we anticipate would be the reaction of some of those attempts, both by the Soviet Union and by these Eastern European countries? Are we really getting into an area that we are going to be counter-productive and force them to maybe pull back, or to change, or is there some suggestion you have?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, it is the eternal question, and I know from my own experience that almost anything you say can get you into trouble. Fortunately, this is an open hearing, so nothing can leak from it. Usually it is leaks that get you into difficulty.

Cochairman DECONCINI. We will figure out something to leak. [Laughter.]

Mr. SONNENFELDT. It is true that Hungary on the whole has had a rather positive image in this country because of a good deal of contact, and because, in many respects the Hungarians pioneered economic reforms and opening-up their society.

I was just there for the first time in a long-time, and it is really quite remarkable how freely and candidly one can talk with officials, intellectuals, and others in that country, including about the country's problems. In fact, the Hungarians won't let you say more than a sentence or two, before they, themselves, launch into a discussion of their own problems.

The Romanian situation is a bit different. Fifteen years ago the United States was interested in having some special connections with the Romanians because they seemed to be departing from Soviet orthodoxy in some of their foreign policies, and in the way they conducted themselves in the Warsaw Pact and in COMECON. In the meantime, I think the Romanian image in this country has suffered a great deal because of the domestic repression in the country and the inability of the regime there to take advantage of their special relations with the outside world, including the United States, to get their economy into some reasonable shape.

Mr. Chairman, the first general suggestion is perhaps singing to the choir; but I really do think that the U.S. Government, including the Congress, should always be very clear that the United States does not accept the division of Europe as a permanent feature of the international landscape. How that division came about is a long and sad story, but I don't think we should be shy in making it clear that the purposes of our policy will always have to be to breakdown that division. That means, in practice, substantial transformations within and among the countries of Eastern Europe.

I, myself, have used the term "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe as far back as those controversial remarks I made in 1975. That may not be all that flattering to the Finns, but in any event, I think it is something along the lines of what we should be striving for, and we should not make a secret of it. Within that context, I think we should tailor our policies to the particular circumstances in the various countries, rather than treating them as a bloc.

Inevitably, to some extent what we do with the East European countries is subordinated to what we do with the Soviet Union. We should avoid that kind of subordination as much as we can. We should very much encourage all sorts of exchanges in which these countries are open to the outside and people travel back and forth, and ideas are exchanged. We have a good deal of it with Hungary and, remarkably enough, with Poland, just by the nature of that regime.

I don't think we are in a position to make many economic concessions because as a government we don't have the funds for that. Our private, commercial interests obviously watch to see what goes on within those countries, before they make their decisions. I don't think our Government can force a bank, or some commercial concern to do something that it doesn't consider to be in its own commercial interest. But where that is possible, it should be encouraged and private firms should take the lead.

I think we should continue to engage in and intensify political contacts with these countries, governmentally and through parliaments, even when we have some reservations about whether their parliaments are bona fide bodies, and through private groups. The more the merrier, whether it is historians, or economists, artists, whatever. I think the main thing is to give people in these countries the sense they are not cutoff, that they are not forced to stay within the straitjacket, that the world is open to them. That is the best that we can do for now, tailored to the partici lar circumstances in the individual countries.

Cochairman DeConcini. Thank you.

Congressman Richardson, do you have any opening statements you would like to put in the record, before we proceed with the questions?

Representative Richardson. No, Mr. Chairman, but I do have some questions.

Cochairman DeConcini. Thank you very much.

I will ask Senator Lautenberg if he can chair the remaining of these hearings because I have another committee to go to.

Senator LAUTENBERG. I am happy to take over, I don't have anything else to do.

Cochairman DECONCINI. I know you have a lot more to do. You are a good man to stay, you will be well rewarded someplace.

Let me yield to Congressman Feighan from Ohio.

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kaufman, I would like to pose a question to you and ask that Mr. Sonnenfeldt respond to it as well. I think it is important that we try to understand, as best we can, the sources for change and reform in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. If we understand the cause of these reforms, we will be in a better position as we formulate our own policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In that regard, Mr. Kaufman, you said in your testimony that Poland and the Soviet Union have had different sources for reform. I wonder whether or not the difference is as obvious as it would seem to be on the surface? You spoke in your testimony about changes in Poland—whether they be consistent with glasnost or perestroika—which have been forced on the Polish Government by social activism. I think we all fully agree with that, and have witnessed that.

How is this distinguished with changes in the Soviet Union which might otherwise be characterized as relatively daring or as far-sighted leadership? I wonder if that is a fair characterization of what is taking place in the Soviet Union?

Is the leadership in the Soviet Union responding, in fact, more to social activism and attempting to prevent the wrenching pressures that were experienced in Poland?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, I thank you for raising that question, which will give me an occasion to amplify. I think the difference that I was trying to establish is that the social processes were unleashed in Poland which had their own dynamic, which created crisis. And in crisis, people act spontaneously and improvise, and those social forces reverberate.

And I guess what I am saying is that it was a revolutionary situation and continues to be. And I guess in Marxist terms. But there are—in the Soviet Union none of that has happened, and as far as I can see no one has yet been able to isolate the social forces that are coalescing around Gorbachev's policies. I think that is the intent. I think Gorbachev does want to galvanize, does want to—I think we use the example of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, I guess a controlled revolution, change one group of leaders for another group of leaders, interject new values, replace some people with other people. And the delicious irony of all of this is that whatever he does is going to come out different, because history works that way. And what comes out we don't know, dynamics are—I think one of the things he would like to get changed, and not alter too much the nationalities question of the Soviet Union. That is something that hasn't been brought up, but if I can, I would just like to mention that, as that may affect Eastern Europe.

It seems inconceivable to me that he, or whoever succeeds him, will not be preoccupied for the next 25 years with nationalities questions within the Soviet Union. If that happens, I suspect that their capabilities of influencing events outside the Soviet Union will diminish. And I suspect that a certain kind of German aege-

monism will move in. That is one of the things that I wanted to bring out, it seems to me that we are getting into a situation where Poland, and maybe for the rest of Eastern Europe are of primary interest to the Soviet Union, of primary interest to the Germans, and a matter of increasing irrelevance to the rest of the world.

I think that is a very unpleasant situation to—and I would argue, if I can—everybody else made their little pitches—mine would be to support social movements in the ways that we can support social movements, to mention them.

I find it a little appalling that solidarity is more and more regarded as quixotic, romantics who have fallen by the wayside, when in fact, I can make a fairly strong case that they created Gorbachev. And one ought to understand that it was in response to social movements, the spontaneous social movements that these changes occurred.

And the other one I would argue for is that—and this reaffirms what others here have said—is that the United States, perhaps to thwart both the expansion of Germanism into Eastern Europe, because they do have policies, they have clear policies where we, perhaps, don't. And because to me that is an offensive irony that the Soviet Union and Germany remain the two dominate powers in Eastern Europe, that the United States do everything it can to remain a presence. And I think this is something that the people of Eastern Europe would want, and that keeping our—maintaining special relationships with nations, as well with—and, if necessary with governments, but with nations is terribly important.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Very briefly, I think in Poland the pressures for change were pervasive and ran through the society as a whole. We have to remember that the church is an enormous presence and factor in anything that happens in Poland. In addition, it is a country that has been tied to the Soviet Union in the post-war period, and thus there was a powerful national element present in Poland as well.

I think in the Soviet Union there were, and are very powerful pressures for the status quo. Indeed, as one watches Gorbachev, one can see him wrestling with those forces. The irony is probably that Gorbachev himself, as part of the younger Soviet party elite, recognized the stagnation in the system, but essentially thought that he could cope with that by changing economic arrangements.

It is only the latter-day Gorbachev who has plunged so deeply into the other aspects of the reform program that now get so much attention here. I guess he came to understand that you cannot change the economy and make it more dynamic and productive without also changing the condition under which people function, how they debate issues, what they can do in their lives. Glasnost had to become a companion to perestroika.

I think the strongest pressure, apart from the younger elite around Gorbachev himself, in the Soviet Union for change comes from the professional class, essentially a class of people outside the party structure, even though many of them are party members—the younger scientists, younger professionals, technicians, engineers, managers and so on, the yuppies. For them it is an act of faith that the Soviet Union must move into modernity: it also hap-

pens to coincide with their interests. And when faith and interest coincide you get a fairly powerful series of pressures.

And they, I think, on the whole are Gorbachev's strongest supporters. But in the party apparatus and in the governmental bureaucracy, and among blue-collar workers who hear about price rises on bread and apartments, the possibility of unemployment, some of the things that they have been accustomed to, I think Gorbachev has much more of a problem. And that is really the great and fascinating riddle of Soviet politics over the next period, whether Gorbachev and the yuppies can move the party bureaucracy and government bureaucracy, and the large mass of workers and peasants into more modern and open ways of doing things.

Representative FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would like the opportunity to turn to some other questions, if time permits.

Senator LAUTENBERG. We will do that.

I would ask Senator Wirth, you were here before I was.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.

Let me ask you all to put yourselves in the position of sitting down with the new President-elect in the post-Reagan era, the first Wednesday in November 1988, after we have signed an IMF Treaty and there has been a significant START Treaty. And let's assume that Gorbachev is still in power and the momentum of a vibrant Soviet leadership is still echoing around Europe and around the world. Given those assumptions, what would you be counseling a new President-elect about: first, the most significant opportunity that we in the United States have in dealing with a changing situation with the Soviets?

And, second, what is the most significant downside? What is the most significant set of problems that we are going to face? Is the upside the Soviet economy—the changes that you were talking about, Mr. Sonnenfeldt? Is the downside conventional arms? Our relationship there is fracturing in NATO—Ambassador Luers, perhaps I can start with you.

Ambassador LUERS. Well, I would say to the President-elect that if things continue to go the way they are, we have some real opportunities to change the post-war shape of Europe.

To do that you should announce a policy early after you have been inaugurated that has the following components: first, that the policies that we have followed up to now, "differentiation" will be discarded, since reform is underway in all of Eastern Europe, we will treat all of the countries equally, although in different ways, and try to be supportive of the way these governments and parties try to evolve their different approaches to dealing with their relations with the Soviet Union. We will say to the Soviets that we believe that they are sincere in their ideas of reforms, and you should tell Gorbachev, Mr. President-elect, that we believe that now that changes have taken place to the degree that they have, we want good relations with you, we want improved relations, but that doesn't mean we also don't want to pursue actively the future of central Europe and how to change that history, how to redo what was done after the Second World War. Which means that we are going to have active relations with those countries in Eastern Europe. And we are going to find ways to give them political and

economic opportunities that they don't have under the current circumstances.

The third, I would say that, look, we are not looking for the Finlandization of Eastern Europe, we are looking for the Austrianization of central Europe, what we would like to see is more agreements, like we together, signed with the Austrian State Treaty, which offered the opportunity for Austria to become an independent neutral country in the central part of Europe.

This is our dream, Mr. Gorbachev, it is our dream for Hungary, it is eventually our dream for Poland, and let's talk about that. If really we have the future of Europe on the agenda, our agenda includes the ultimate independence of these countries as neutral countries, able to function under their own right without dominance of either the East or the West.

Key to this, I think, is a set of policies that has to do with the relief of, I think, the end of Jackson-Vanik and the Stevenson amendments. It has to do with our fulfilling our obligations of the Helsinki Final Act to have open trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. And I would think that a more active policy of contacts is important.

The downside, Mr. President, the risk to this is twofold, first if you pursue this policy too actively with Eastern Europe, without close attention to, and consultations with the Soviets, you could blow that relationship and re-invigorate their pathological security about their borders.

We must be sensitive to some degree to that concern, although my view is that as long as we talk to them about it, we have fulfilled our obligation.

But the most dangerous part is that Gorbachev really isn't serious, that he says what he says because he wants to change the Soviet Union, but ultimately the security of the Soviet Union is overriding. And for them the security is the continued strong support of the countries of Eastern Europe for the Warsaw Pact Treaty. And that, if in fact, reform—runaway reform does take place in Poland, or Czechoslovakia, under new leadership, or even East Germany, and the Soviets have to choose between their national security and the avowed commitment of Gorbachev to a variety of independent nations in Eastern Europe, they might use force.

Under those circumstances, the use of military force in Eastern Europe could be a very dangerous turn of events in Europe, and one that might rekindle the cold war into something worse.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, basically, for 28 years I have been reporting on and watching parades, rather than telling them where to go. And it's awesome, your question is somewhat awesome, but I would associate myself with everything that Ambassador Luers said, except that I would also add that there are points of common interest that do seem to be emerging. For instance, I think this is the first time that it is in Gorbachev's interest to have stability, real stability in Eastern Europe. And it is in the United States' interest to have.

When I first came to Poland it struck me that there was so little difference between a policy that would encourage things to get worse and a policy that would encourage things to get better, from

our point of view, from the U.S. point of view, that it would be very hard to choose between them. Should things get worse in Eastern Europe, that pins them down, that causes problems for the Soviets. If that is an evil empire, that is a good idea.

If things get better, well, it is not because of them, it is because of us, sympathies of the nation are with the West, the nation is strengthened and can go on to struggle against totalitarian forms, that's a good idea.

And I think that that was essentially the impasse, should things get worse, or should things get better. I think now there is a generally emerging notion that things ought to get better, if they can, they should. And it would be in everybody's interest that they do so.

The other notion that seems to be crystalizing and emerging is central Europe replacing Eastern Europe, and perhaps thinking in terms of what kind of Europe will exist in the year 2000, and can certain of these societies in Eastern Europe serve as linking groups?

That's the ideological fault line, it is Rome and Byzantium, can you use countries like Hungary and Poland as legitimate transfers of technology, culture, political culture? Is there something in the Polish experience, for instance, that alarmed Gorbachev? Is he farseeing enough to see that? Yes. Right now there is a party that commands and is strong, but if it is ossifying, if new blood isn't entering into it, can there be situations like Poland?

So I think there is a mutuality of interest emerging that augers well.

The downside is simply that I am not sure that the countries of Eastern Europe have the tradition and the sovereign strength to support their indigenous aspirations.

And, second, should—I mean, I could conceive, perhaps, miraculously of a Soviet leader accepting an Austrian Poland, but could he accept an Austrian Ukraine? And then it gets terribly complicated.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. The first thing that I would remember, Senator, in the setting that you have established here is that one of the most perishable things that happens in our Government is the advice you give a President on the first Wednesday, after the first Tuesday in November. If he invites me, he will invite at least 50 others, and what he is told bears little resemblance to what he will do on January 20 at 12:15 p.m., and thereafter.

I would have a couple of don'ts for the President, however. One is to forget about the history books. Historians are a fickle crowd, and the effort to try and rig the history books 20, 30, 40, 50 years hence by what you are doing now is almost bound to fail.

The second thing, I would urge for this set of issues, as well as others, is for the President to get his executive branch organized and be clear how, in terms of process, he wants to run the country's foreign policy—whether he wants to have the White House as the dominant actor and coordinating agency, or whether he wants to spread it around the executive agencies in the Government. But both won't work and will merely create confusion. And in this period of flux that we are going to be experiencing in our relations with the Soviets, we will need greater discipline in our Govern-

ment—I won't even mention the relationship between the Executive and the Congress in these matters: it goes without saying that that is included.

The necessity of some discipline will be even greater than in other periods as we engage in a variety of negotiations and other contacts.

The third thing that I would urge is that fascinating, intellectually and emotionally, as it is to deal with the Soviet Union on the issues of arms and arms control agreements, the content of our overall relations with the Soviets and the opportunities that we might have for shaping events cannot be based on arms control agreements alone. There are many other ways in which we impinge one on the other, whether these are the clashes of interest and ambitions in different parts of the world, or the issues of Central and Eastern Europe that have been discussed, or questions of human rights—in sum, the way the Soviet Union and we conduct ourselves in the world.

So don't be overly fascinated and preoccupied with arms control agreements. And remember that the military part of the equation depends only to a degree on what may be negotiated across the green table with the Soviets. It depends to an even larger degree on what we do ourselves with our military forces and what they do with theirs.

And, finally, I would say that the Gorbachev approach to the Soviet Union's problems, and to the problems of the Soviet Empire, may be opening opportunities for changing things that we haven't had since the Second World War. We need to be particularly alert to those. Yet remember that our influence in the end on many of the issues we have been discussing is limited. It is not nonexistent, but it is limited.

In some respects with regard to Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union itself, our friends and allies in Europe can have considerable impact. Thus, I believe that whatever we attempt to do with the Soviets, and whatever we attempt to do with respect to the countries of central and eastern Europe, we must do in some degree of concord with our allies in western Europe.

Some reference was made earlier to the possibilities of a new German hegemony. That may indeed be in the minds of some Germans, and there may be in the back of the Soviet minds some old notion about a Soviet-German understanding over this rather unruly, uncertain group of countries between the two.

I think this is for the Europeans an even more serious issue than for the United States. Hence, we should remember that it is not an abdication of leadership on our part, but an act of statesmanship not to treat the problems of Europe as though they were exclusively American-Soviet problems, but as part of a wider process that very much includes our European allies.

Mr. KLINE. It does seem to me that it is primarily because of domestic developments that things are moving in the right direction, at least they are moving in a direction that is helpful to us at the moment. And therefore, it seems to me that we are in the fortunate situation that we don't need to do too much, that we should let these issues unravel to some degree, or play out, and watch. And try to prod them along when the time is right.

There does seem to me to be some indication that the Soviets are willing to deal with the problem of Afghanistan first. Eastern Europe is very sensitive for them, as someone mentioned, and any kind of American motion there worries them. They feel first they have to get their own house in order, and then they will worry about Eastern Europe.

I do think that aggressive American actions in Eastern Europe would unsettle them. I think those who are liberal in the Soviet Union, if there are such people, feel that Eastern Europe will be solved later. In the long-term the problem of the division of Germany poses a risk. I doubt whether 50 years from now Germany will be in the shape that it is in now. We should think about it, I don't know that we need to do anything about it, but there is that question.

I would like to go back just for a minute to the earlier question about the difference between Poland and the Soviet Union. In Poland what led to Solidarity and the abrupt change was a deliberate and conscious alliance between the intelligentsia and the workers against the Government. What you do have now in the Soviet Union it seems to me is an alliance of the leadership with the yuppies, intelligentsia, whatever you want to call them, and the workers are really excluded. It almost seems to me that the intelligentsia trusts the leadership more and the leadership trusts the intelligentsia more than they do the workers. The workers, the peasants and the common people are some sort of a dark force to everyone on top in the Soviet Union, unlike Poland where there was really a popular revolution, the workers and common people took some part.

So far in the Soviet Union all these changes are not just restricted to the intelligentsia and the leadership, but to the Moscow leadership and intelligentsia. Really no change has proceeded outside of Moscow, or very, very little.

Ambassador LUERS. Mr. Chairman, could I deal with this yuppie thing just a minute?

I think that is maybe a little facile. Most of the major reformers in the Soviet Union today—Zaslavskaya, Albakin, Aganbegyan, Petrovsky, a few on the foreign policy side, even Bezsmertnikh, who is my age, are not people who are the young, up and coming people. The real reformers in Soviet society, the ones who are writing all of the think pieces and the ones who Andropov went to, whom Gorbachev went to, are people who were blown out into the world by the 1956 speech of Khrushchev and found themselves suddenly in a phase of looking at a new Soviet society in post-Stalin Russia. And these are the people who were resuscitated, again, during the early days of Brezhnev and crushed again after the events of the sixties, and then have come back.

There is a real question in my mind whether the young people are really "with it." It is true in Czechoslovakia. I think it is true in Germany, in East Germany. The people who are now speaking reform in Czechoslovakia were the same people who were saying the same thing in 1968.

And I just want to put a little balance on that.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I would just point out that in the Soviet Union people in their fifties are young.

Senator LAUTENBERG. In this country, too, I want you to know.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. I think there is a question about some of the young, especially the children of the elites who have had the "good life" and may not be "with it" quite so much. But one does encounter a good many people in their thirties who are, I think, relatively speaking, in the yuppy group, as well as the ones that Bill refers to.

Senator LAUTENBERG. I feel like this panel on the sociology of the Soviet Union and its friends—in the process, Congressman, I arrived third in line, so I will take my questions first and will not take the prerogative of the Chairman just to hold the mike and stay here with it.

I thought the panel's response to the questions and statements were exceptionally good and very helpful, certainly to me. I am a new member of this Commission and I completed a trip just a few weeks ago with Congressman Richardson and Chairman Hoyer, and a couple people from the State Department, the Helsinki Commission, through Poland and Romania, and then I went off on my own unwelcomed visit to the Soviet Union. They did give me the top guy in the environment department, I am chairman of an environment committee and I wanted to discuss human rights and he wanted to discuss environment. And that's the way much of our trip went. We were prevented in Romania, certainly, from making contact with people in the real sense. We saw dancer after dancer, and musician after musician, and restaurant after restaurant, and so it went.

And as I hear each of you—and correct me, if I am wrong—I hear each of you significantly encouraged by the Gorbachev initiative. I hear each of you talking about cooperative ventures, and I hear each of you saying that—or implying, at least, that we not be too aggressive in forcing our agenda there.

This is after all, the Human Rights Commission, and our focus is, Mr. Kline, perhaps single-issue, and that is to get the individual liberties and rights dealt with and then deal with the macro issue, in terms of country to country.

And I would ask you, first, we have a Human Rights Conference that the Soviets are trying to put together. Is it a bit, if not hypocritical, cynical to be marching off to salute that kind of an international conference in the Soviet Union when, in fact, the general repression level, though it may have been lifted a little, has a long way to go?

Second, how far do we take this agenda? Do we accomplish what we want with this pursuit of ours and say, "Look, let's see how your people speak out, how can they write, are you going to license, are you going to issue the copying machines in the Soviet Union?"

We met with the fellow who publishes a little publication called Glasnost, 100 copies, 10 pages each, individually typed, no carbon paper—are we going to look for those kinds of expressions, before we say that we are going to cooperate in any way? Do we drag our heels, do we force them to drag their heels?

Certainly in Romania we didn't, or at least I didn't see anything that encourages me that this Government is about to not only embrace change, but even understand change. My best visit there, they tried to shepherd me and guide me every step along the way

and finally I fought my way loose, and I said, "No, I am not going to go to the library with you, I am going to walk in the town."

"But the library is interesting."

"I know the library is interesting, I don't want to go."

I found my way to a bookstore and all I saw was 500 books, each one written by, authored by, published by Ceaucescu, with his picture on the front cover. They all looked like his high school graduation picture, but nevertheless they were there.

So what are the barometers? What are the yardsticks that we use to see progress? Do we kind of resist and say, "OK, we are not going to do that kind of business, unless we do the human rights kind of business first."

If you would, a quick perspective, it doesn't have to go in the order of the seats.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt, maybe you would like to respond first.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, Senator, on the specific question of this conference in Moscow, I must say at this point, I would go rather easy on that.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Rather easy on objecting, or supporting?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. No, on supporting it. I think that perhaps the time is ripe to have a seminar on human rights in Moscow, and see how it goes. But I really don't think that at this point we are at a stage where a full-fledged, large-scale conference of this sort would be appropriate, unless, of course, some very rudimentary conditions were met, and I think we would get into a big haggle about this.

So, I would take it in easy steps and perhaps split the subject and have some lesser event, rather than something that can be pictured within the Soviet Union as celebrating the record of this present Soviet regime, even under Gorbachev, in the human rights area.

We must remember on human rights the issue is not only emigration, which is the one that we have paid so much attention to, but the issue is also the people who stay behind. And in that respect, I think a lot must happen yet before we can really say that there is significant change and progress, and that it is, on the whole, an irreversible change.

So, I would go slow.

In terms of the emphasis on, broadly speaking, human rights and human conditions in the Soviet Union, and in the countries of Eastern Europe, these are proper subjects for us, for our Government, for the Congress, and of course, for the public at-large. Some parts of the public don't need a great deal of encouragement on this. It is a proper subject because it does, in the end, go to the question of how open and transparent this system is, how well we understand the manner in which decisions get made, how much we can expect to happen in the unspoken way in which civil societies function with each other, rather than making everything a matter of agreement and treaty.

There are so many things about relationships among people and societies and governments that should go without saying in the sense that they cannot and should not be negotiated like a treaty. They are part of civility and part of a relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, that very often cannot be framed in terms of international agreements. Where it is possible,

we should do that; where we have agreements already, whether it is Helsinki, or bilateral, or U.N. conventions and so on, we certainly should not ignore those, and try to keep the Soviets and the other regimes in Eastern Europe to those.

But change in these areas, it seems to me, cannot, in many respects, be negotiated. It has to be part of the process. And, therefore, I think we should encourage the process by every way we can, through government and private sources. And we should observe it and make our own judgments as time goes on.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Luers, I guess what I am trying to understand is what do you think that we ought to be doing to either force, encourage, stimulate—should we be tight-fisted on these things?

We say unless you do this, we are not going to do that, unless you do this, we are not going to trade with you. Unless you do this, we are not going to participate in conferences of this type—we are talking about attitude here.

Ambassador LUERS. Well, ultimately, taking the second part of the question first that you posed to Hal, I don't think that we have a chance to fundamentally change the Soviet society. I think we have a chance to improve living conditions in some areas, save lives, get people out of jail.

So I think the strategy should be, I think as Hal indicated, not overall legislation of change through treaties, but episodic efforts to save people.

On the subject of this human rights conference, I think that they would put up a lot of human beings, save a lot of problems to have that conference, even if there is one, it is worth it. We lose nothing, it seems to me.

The fact that we could have that conference, that we could support it and say, "OK, show us," and then tell them what we want them to show us. If some people are let out of jail, if some rights are granted to certain minorities that weren't there before, if some people are allowed to say things that weren't able to before, I think we look at it that way. We look at it tacticly, we are constantly trying to do things that will get them to do things we want them to do for their people.

I don't think linkage on trade helps, because once you have made that linkage, and once Jackson-Vanik was actually final, and once the détente collapsed, where do you go from there? I don't think the tantalizing benefit of trade is going to help human rights. I do think what works are individual events—the strategy of actually managing the issue day after day, year after year, asking for specific cases.

Every time George Shultz goes over, every time you go over say, "Look, we want this person out of jail," that's what works. And over the long-term that is what we have to do.

Mr. KLINE. Well, the reason I think it might be worth having the human rights conference is precisely for the reason you say, so that when you go there as part of our delegation, they can't say, "Well, we want to talk about environmental issues." The point of the conference is humanitarian issues.

You can say, "Why are Meiman and Alexander Lerner not allowed to emigrate, why is Lukyanenko still in prison and Mart Niklus?"

I think that the advantage would be, it would be hard for them, having invited and pressed for this conference, not to do what Mr. Luers says, to give some kind of response. If it is inadequate, I think it shows that they have a very long way to go.

But I believe that they would pay a price by resolving some of these cases. And it would give you that leverage to go and say, "This is what we are not here to discuss, the environment—we are here to discuss human rights, and that's the purpose. Not to evade the issue, but to raise it."

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, I was just reminded, 3 years ago I attended a Helsinki meeting in Budapest, and there is a convention around the Helsinki meetings of having NGO's. I don't know to what extent you can negotiate these things, but it seems to me that if one of the prices for a conference were the appearance there of nongovernment human rights activists, of not government-to-government, but an alternate conference that goes on, as one did in Ottawa, as one did in Budapest, as one did wherever these things were held, and if you were to say to them, "OK, you guys have your conference"—now the Hungarians allowed people to come in, they allowed critics to come in, and allowed the Helsinki groups to send—the unofficial Helsinki groups to send their people, writers, activists, and then canceled their meeting hall, and it ended up with the meeting being held in people's apartments. But still the foreign press was there, it extended the debate. It extended the negotiations.

So, I think that is important. And I, too, would hope that this kind of tactical negotiations could precede a conference, and points could be won. And I would think that under those circumstances it would be useful.

I just want to say one quick thing though, there is constant negotiations. For instance human rights in Poland has become getting people out of jail. And there are no political prisoners in Poland. And somehow along the way the question of having free association and free labor unions has been lost, effectively conceded.

So there is a gain in which hostages are taken, put into prison, released and gains are made. But it is an ongoing dynamic process and it ought to be understood in those terms.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you.

Congressman Richardson, I am going to turn the chairmanship over to you, and you have the room until 12:30, if you want to ask some questions.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you.

I would like to ask Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr. Luers the key question which I think Senator Lautenberg has asked, and I want to persist on this because this is the essence of this Commission, this is our charter, and that is human rights, foreign policy. And what I would like to ask Mr. Luers and Mr. Sonnenfeldt, although I think I know your answer, is the specificity of what we are doing.

In other words, what do we do with Jackson-Vanik? Do we repeal it? Do we strengthen it? Do we let it stand as it is? And if you look at Soviet performance since Gorbachev, the staff tells me that

there have been 6,000 Soviet Jewish exits, which is an improvement over the last two Soviet leaders, but it is still, I think, rather shameful if you measure it against any acceptable human rights standard.

What I am trying to ask is: exactly what do these negotiations that Mr. Shifter from the State Department is having with the Soviets on human rights do in the context of this IMF agreement?

Now, obviously I don't think anyone has to say that unless you release another 2,000 there will be no IMF agreement. But I just am trying to get the specific view from you on current legislative initiatives that we have. Do you feel that they are working, or that they need alterations? In light of Gorbachev, do they need to be changed?

Ambassador LUERS. Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson are a little different, but on the Jackson-Vanik amendment what I was proposing to Senator Wirth was that Jackson-Vanik be suspended for Eastern Europe, not for the Soviet Union.

The only thing that has happened in Eastern Europe is the granting of MFN to Romania and Hungary, and just recently to Poland. But what it did was it distorted our policies in Eastern Europe, and it led us down the path of being the strong supporter of the most horrendous government in Eastern Europe, which is Romania.

And what does that do for human rights? It helps some emigration, but the human rights situation, as you know, in Romania is terrible.

So I would say first that you should suspend for 5 years—find a way to do this legally under our laws—to suspend for 5 years the application of Jackson-Vanik to all of the countries of Eastern Europe, to allow for a process of trade to develop, and find out to what degree this does result in change that we think is potential individually for all of these countries. And it lessens the degree to which you isolate Romania as a specific friendly case.

On the subject of the Soviet Union, which is more complicated, it seems to me we are into that now, and what we should do is agree with them on a way in which they would be so responsive with regard to emigration and refuseniks and the Jewish population, that over a year or so we would measure against some specific objective. And if they achieve that objective, we would say, "OK, let's try to develop a trade relationship. We will suspend the Jackson-Vanik amendment for a period of time, and see how things develop."

Now if Jackson-Vanik is applied for every quirky thing they do with regard to human rights, then you are going to always have it in place. But my belief is that the linkage that was made between trade and human rights was the wrong linkage. I still believe that is incorrect, I don't believe it achieved our objective, and I believe by unlinking it, you should link trade items to greater access to that society through trade relations. And the human rights issue should flow from this expanded relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, I didn't think that the Jackson-Vanik approach was a good one in 1973 and 1974 for a variety of reasons.

And, therefore, I have no great attachment to it, although I recognize the political realities and the legal realities. It is on the books.

I think it is very difficult to legislate selectively in these matters, and therefore, it seems to me that there may be some value in looking at Jackson-Vanik, and provide a bit more flexibility in the waiver aspects of that legislation. One might perhaps give the President the opportunity to apply somewhat more differentiated standards in the waiver in regard to emigration, perhaps in terms of progress on emigration, rather than flat assertions concerning no barriers to emigration.

And then one might make the waiver authority applicable for a period, perhaps, of 2 years, rather than 1 year, in order, for one thing, to lessen the burdens of constantly being in a cycle of debates up here about the waiver and its continued application. That I think would provide some flexibility to observe the way in which this matter is progressing. It would of course still give the Congress the possibility of parting company with the President, but it would also provide incentives on the other side, on the Soviet side and the East European side.

Now, I have to say that my longer term purpose in all of this would be to see if we cannot dismantle this particular structure, because I think the rigid connection between economic relationships and emigration and human rights issues is very tenuous and sometimes quite counter-productive. It denies us leverage. But given what we have got, these would be my suggestions, at least for now.

There is some distinction to be made between MFN and credits, government credits, or government-guaranteed credits. I would be very cautious on those in any event, whether they are connected to human rights, or not. I think that the Soviets at least should have to come into our private credit markets and take their "lumps" there. I realize that they got away with a very favorable set of terms recently, but I think as long as we do not have a "dirigiste" economy, we should leave it to private credit institutions to make the deals that they think are commercially justifiable.

But in regard to the Soviet Union, I would be very, very restrictive as to how much government credit I granted in present circumstances.

Representative RICHARDSON. I have one final question, and it is to you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, it is a matter of very recent interpretation. A question that many of us are asking concerns General Secretary Gorbachev and the INF Treaty. We saw last week that he decided to up the ante, or he decided to lie, on an IMF and a summit. Now he is coming back—and I guess my question is in light of your expertise in the area, was his recent hesitation a result of a weakening position of the Soviet Union, or did he feel the weakening position in the President's political standing? What was he trying to do, and where do you think it is going to lead?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, it is in the realm of speculation. With all of glasnost there still aren't investigative reporters over there who give you a minute-by-minute account of how this particular episode unfolded with the Kremlin. I think it was a ragged performance. I think there was a mixture of domestic Soviet considerations and judgments concerning the situation in this country.

I think that at one level Gorbachev and his colleagues over there, tried to sell this "horse of the summit" for about the fourth time, and see what they could get from President Reagan in his present condition. If they had any idea that they could get him to pay for a summit in this country with his SDI program, I think they totally misread his views on that subject. So even on those grounds it was not a particularly smart move. But we have to realize that beneath the veneer, or perhaps it is by now the new thinking there, there still lurks the old mentality. We got an example of it last week, and it backfired, which may explain the quick backtracking that is occurring.

But I think there may well be some Soviet leaders who are asking Gorbachev "Where is the beef?" He is getting a lot of attention in the Western media, being really a cult hero in the West; and they assume, I guess, that if he comes over here, he will be a media idol on the talk shows and so on.

Yet, beyond the personal glory for Gorbachev, they may well be concerned about what it all produces in the end for the Soviet Union. He may therefore have been under some pressure to attach some additional conditions, in order to be able to reassure, or tell his colleagues "I am going to bring home some part of the bacon that you are looking for." But I think the tactics that were used were clumsy. Our administration, after some initial, excessive display of disappointment, played it well. The support the administration got from up here was good, even from people who don't necessarily agree with the President on SDI; and the way the episode played in Europe I think didn't do the Soviets any good. So, they seem to have backtracked.

I would still wait and see just what Mr. Shevardnadze comes up with the next time, because in their statement so far, they haven't actually said they are prepared to have a summit in the United States. And they haven't actually withdrawn the conditions with which they confronted Secretary Shultz last week.

So, there is still some question whether this project is now clear of all of these "ifs" and "buts" that were attached in Moscow.

Representative RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

We have a vote now, and I think I have exhausted my questions.

The gentleman from Ohio, would you conclude the hearing?

Representative FEIGHAN. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question.

Aside from considering modification or repeal of Jackson-Vanik, should we allow the Soviets to have observer status in the GATT or the IMF?

Does anybody want to take a shot at that?

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Our attitude with respect to the Soviets getting into international financial institutions should be that we can support that, if they qualify. That means they should operate by the rules, which in some instances may be quite difficult for them. In the case of the GATT, there is a clear connection with the pricing system, and other aspects of their economy.

But we can take a positive view on it, with the stipulation that it is they who are joining a club, rather than a club that is joining them. And I think that would include things like direct access to Soviet economic activity and institutions. The point has already

been made that in economic relations we should get away as much as possible from a rather simplistic bartering relationship, and have much more intertwining relationships which do open up that society and that economy to more foreign influence.

Representative FEIGHAN. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony which was very compelling and helpful.

Thank you very much.

Representative RICHARDSON. I want to thank the witnesses for their outstanding testimony and performance in appearing today. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 12:09 p.m.]

APPENDIX A

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO

OPENING STATEMENT

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

HEARING ON

U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE AND

THE U.S.S.R.

Mr. Chairman:

I want to begin by thanking you and our distinguished Co-Chairman Senator DeConcini for scheduling this important hearing. As we face the prospect of an INF treaty and a Washington summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, we should review U.S. attitudes toward eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The witnesses assembled here this morning are highly qualified to discuss these matters.

Before hearing our witnesses' views, we should consider the context in which these questions arise. Even though the Soviet Union no longer exercises rigid control over its eastern European satellites, developments in the Soviet Union still determine the direction and set the limits of developments in the other Warsaw Pact states. So we should begin this discussion by examining Soviet efforts to shape our attitudes toward the U.S.S.R.

At previous Commission hearings, we have heard testimony from distinguished witnesses concerning Gorbachev's "new thinking" and its components, glasnost, perestroika, and democratizatsiya. While these new Soviet policies are very serious and quite real, they also have a very carefully calculated propaganda component. This propaganda component is designed and intended to affect Western public opinion and, through our democratic political systems, the foreign and defense policies of Western governments.

To what end is this propaganda campaign directed? It would be fair to say that it is intended to change our pre-Grobachev view of the Soviet Union. Clearly, this Soviet campaign is intended to change our views in ways that are favorable to the Soviet Union.

The next question is, "favorable to the Soviet Union in what way?" We should be very interested in the answer to that question.

The heart of politics is perceptions. Public perceptions, newly created or reshaped, create political reality in democracies. Democratic governments cannot long pursue policies which diverge from domestic political reality.

Has the Soviet bear become a lamb? Or is it merely trying on the fleece of civilized international behavior to win a temporary respite in its competition with the West? Once it has improved its relative position, will the Soviet Union simply return to its expansionist imperial policies?

The question for us to consider, as policy makers, is whether we should allow ourselves to go in the direction in which we are being pushed by this Soviet propaganda campaign?

Merely examining U.S. attitudes toward eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. directs our attention at the results of the Soviet propaganda campaign. It asks how we should respond to the "new facts" this campaign has so effectively created.

While we cannot ignore public opinion, we must take a responsible view of these developments and do more than react to public opinion poll results. We have to ask the right questions ourselves and try to lead and inform public opinion.

In view of the current developments in U.S. - Soviet relations, I counsel caution. I do not believe we would be wise to respond to changing impressions of Soviet policies and behaviors, especially when these impressions are, at

least in part, the product of a very skillful propaganda campaign.

We must not deceive ourselves through wishful thinking. We would make a mistake of historic dimensions if we came to believe that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is about to relinquish any of its power and we acted on that belief.

The Soviet leadership is attempting to win a respite in its competition with the West and the United States in particular. During that respite, Gorbachev wants to build a pragmatic, Leninist Soviet Union. He wants to create a dynamic communist state able to vigorously resume its drive toward the predicted victory of world communism.

There should be no question that the creation of a Soviet Union with an economy that worked and that produced high quality, advanced technology products would not be in the United States' best interests. So long as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains in undisputed and total control of the power of the Soviet state, and so long as its long range national strategy is focused upon world domination, we must not waver in our opposition to the Soviet Union.

I have long supported our policy of differentiation -- treating each eastern European Warsaw Pact state difierently based upon its own national identity, policies, and actions. However, I have never lost sight of the limits on that policy.

As I said earlier, the Soviet Union sets the direction and limits of any developments in eastern Europe. East Berlin, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, most recently, Poland, have all felt the Soviet hand on their political leashes.

Moreover, because the pressure for liberalization in these eastern European states is very great, their communist governments must be very careful and many have chosen to be very repressive. So, while Gorbachev's "new thinking" appears to provide room for these states to move in directions we desire, their own governments have not reacted well to this possibility.

While we examine developments in eastern Europe and look for ways to expand these states' scope for action independent from Soviet domination, we must not forget the military and economic links which bind these states to the Soviet Union. We also have to remember that the Soviet Union has the leverage, power, experience, and knowledge to turn U.S. policies toward eastern European states to its own advantage.

It seems that whenever we get into the specifics of one of these periods of detente between East and West, we come down to trade. The Soviet Union and its allies all seek western technology and seek to buy it with borrowed western money. We don't usually call it that -- we describe it as "trade credits." We usually don't look very hard at the results of the trade we fund with these credits, either.

The problem is that, to a certain extent, <u>any</u> additional economic resources we provide to an interdependent economic entity like COMECON allows a substitution effect to take place. So long as the highest priority in the dominant economy in the system, the Soviet economy, remains the production of military equipment to support Soviet imperial designs, <u>any</u> net economic input we provide to any COMECON member state ultimately increases Soviet military strength.

Moreover, regardless of any guarantees we may obtain concerning any technical or industrial project we may begin, the fact remains that there are no consequences to the breach of these guarantees and there is no way to prevent such breaches when the project is physically located in a Warsaw Pact state. The political authority which controls the police and the armed forces in the area where the project is located controls the uses to which its products may be put.

The United States was assured that the products of the Kama River truck plant in the Soviet Union, the project Ford Motor Company helped build during the heyday of the last detente, would not be used for military purposes. Yet, when the Soviet Army operates in Afghanistan, its soldiers and its logistical support are carried in trucks manufactured in that plant.

How long will it take us to learn not to misjudge the Soviet Union based upon its own propaganda? How long will it take us to avoid repeating the same mistakes we made in the past?

Let's wait for real change in the Soviet Union, change of a kind which dilutes the CPSU's control, change that leads to real Soviet respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens. As many of the Soviet dissidents and refuseniks who have appeared before this Commission have made clear, Soviet behavior is not going to change until the Soviet state changes.

Release of dissidents and refuseniks whose cases have made headlines in the West is not enough. Tinkering with the Soviet criminal code is not enough, nor is permitting a more free intellectual and cultural atmosphere. Increased

emigration rates, at levels far below those reached in the late 1970's, are not enough. New arms reduction agreements are not enough.

What is enough is for the Soviet Union to relinquish its revolutionary ideology which, combined with its historic imperial ambitions, make it a militarized state unable to tolerate internal dissent and determined to subvert or crush any external competition. It must take the United Nations Charter to heart and respect the national sovereignty and independence of its neighbors. It must stop pursuing its Marxist dream of a communist world and its Leninist vision of the Soviet Union as the dominant force in that world. It must learn to live as a member state of the civilized community of nations.

Mr. Chairman, I am interested to learn the views of our distinguished witnesses. I hope they will deal with some of the concerns I have just set forth. I am confident they have much to tell us.

Thank you.